Spenglerism with East Asian characteristics

This article discusses what Mr. King calls the most "notorious stalwart" of the Chinese intellectual dark web, Mr. Liu Chung-king.

Rooted in the philosophy of Oswald Spengler, in particular the theory of history laid out in the Decline of the West, Mr. Liu outlines future civilizational states for East Asia. By first positing that China is not a nation, but rather the remains of a nation, peopled by the fellaheen, sometimes known as the "Chinese people", Mr. Liu derives potential implications for East Asia. The use of the word "fellaheen", is particularly incisive, as it is the term given by the Arabs to the indigenous peasants living in Egypt during their conquest. While they had a continuity in beliefs and lifestyles with that of Ancient Egyptians, these people had ceased to exist as a nation. As the only possible way out in the philosophy of Spengler is to invent new ethnicities or local Cultures, Mr. Liu's followers have begun to invent their own nations.

The blow to the liberal world order in WWI is something that humanity has never fully recovered from. While the projected scenarios by Mr. Liu may appear fringe, I see many similarities between this and the intellectual dark web of the West. The only significant division that seems to remain, is language.

>Whether or not Liu makes any progress in bringing the American barbarians around, his ideas and jargon remain present and potent on the Chinese-language internet.

Thinking of similarities, I think there are parallels in Liu Zhongjing's thought, at least as it regards ethnogenesis, with those of the roots-seeking movement in contemporary Chinese literature and film, as well as Taiwan native-place literature. These were both underway at about the same time, ultimately had the same source (premodern tradition, but mostly early modern texts, sometimes critical and sometimes elegaic, sometimes angry and sometimes nostalgic, written for various reasons, about the native place), and shared similar motivations: in both places, as party-state dominance over literary creation weakened, as the party-state eased up on a specific type of Chinese nationalism, a literary nativism followed the rediscovery of a suppressed reality—namely, that regional, tribal, local identities were more durable than the recent myths of modern national unity.

I might argue that there is not much left of that local identity, or it has become increasingly superficial; the myths of Chinese national unity have been expanded, so that most remnants are no longer subversive (the Taiwan situation is different); and, like every other place on earth, all generational inheritance has been short-circuited.

That's why, I suspect, the projects spun out of Liu Zhongjing's sphere are so weird. There is not real to draw on, so it's all fantasy. That is in part intentional, too, of course, if you agree with the thesis that everything after the Han dynasty is a wash. The fantasies are not very appealing, however. Perhaps the fantasies of the roots-seekers—kingdoms of highwaymen, esoteric religious observances, closed off—seemed, if more authentic, also unappealing.

A few scattered thoughts, that all.

>>1871
>most remnants are no longer subversive (the Taiwan situation is different); and, like every other place on earth, all generational inheritance has been short-circuited.
>There is not real to draw on, so it's all fantasy.

There seems to be a bit of a contradiction here. If you first suggested that there are remnants, that means that this is not a fantasy. If the issue is short-circuiting of generational inheritance, perhaps it might seem weird to non-electricians to diagnose the problem from the circuit breaker.

I don't speak Northern Mandarin in SF's Little Toishan, lest I be seen as an orc.

I'm not familiar with this guy's work, but it seems odd to suggest that China isn't a nation but rather the remains of one. From the western perspective, that seems true of 100 years ago, but now they have undergone a sort of ethnoregenesis with the revolution and modernization. They are not just fellaheen peasants waiting to be conquered by some new nation. the majority always is but a minority makes the difference. They have a high functioning upper fifth of patriotic ambitious ethno-nationalists. Of course they also have a lot of cowardly political retardation that leads them to undermine and reject the good thing they've got going on and seek liberation in westernizing their values, but this is also getting worked out with time as they become richer and the CCP proves its longevity, I imagine. If they are having a decline, I would bet it is a new decline, of the new "communist" China, not the same decline that the late Qing dynasty faced. But I don't see evidence of that decline.

Now on the other hand, China is a bunch of fellaheen peasants in that they haven't had a proper warrior aristocracy of any honor for a very long time, and they have disgustingly vulgar habits like torturing and eating cats and such. Maybe that's what this guy means? But again it seems that the Party is the best seed of coming out of that, if the Japanese aren't going to.

>>1873

Agree, it seems very strange to conflate whatever the situation was in ~1912 with what it is today. Whatever one thinks of the CCP, one should give them at least that much. I don't know which will be the most powerful nation in the world in 50 years, but it wouldn't shock me if it turned out to be China.

>China is a bunch of fellaheen peasants in that they haven't had a proper warrior aristocracy of any honor for a very long time, and they have disgustingly vulgar habits like torturing and eating cats and such. Maybe that's what this guy means?

Indeed I think this is the fundamental point that Mr. Liu argues for. Mr. King's article is an attempt to summarize Mr. Liu's thoughts in Chinese with an English article with its length on the order of a fraction of a percentage point of Mr. Liu's output, and so, can only give a small inkling of Mr. Liu's influence on the Chinese internet. Granted, a lot of Mr. Liu's output in Chinese is somewhat rambling, and it is unclear how much it is being mechanized by troll farms.

The key point in Mr. Liu's theory is that what appears to the West as ethnoregenesis
is fundamentally as impossible as ethnoregenesis of the Roman people. Whenever the CCP compares itself to being as glorious as the Tang civilization it has to be regarded as LARP-ing. No amount of building Tang-based amusement parks, showcasing the Sogdian whirl dance on TV, or Tang-inspired animation films can revive the past glory of the Tang (which was a warrior-aristocracy with Central Asian steppe blood). The Party, according to my understanding of his view, has as its nucleus the descendants of senior Party leaders dating to the foundation of the Party at the May Fourth Movement, now most notably represented by none other than the Party General Secretary himself. But the Party that Mr. Liu describes, is not merely the Communist Party (the Red Party), but also the Nationalist Party (the White Party). Both, in fact, depend on the notion of the One China Policy to justify their existence and legitimacy.

If this framework is to be taken seriously, then the past 40 years represents a kind of victory for the White Party, at least in the coastal regions which were "reformed and opened up", allowing bourgeois ideas and values to enter the southeastern coast, thereby allowing for industrial development. Nevertheless China as a whole is controlled by the Party. Wherever there are Chinese people (as constructed by the Chinese nationalist movement dating to the late 19th/early 20th century) in power, there is China. The New Culture Movement, which asserts many decadent ideas ostensibly from the West of the time, cannot be repudiated any more by either the White or Red Party than the notion of China as a nation rather than a Confucian culture.

Mr. Liu is of the opinion that this is not simply an ideological problem for the Chinese state. Pragmatically, it will destabilize the "Chinese nation" by creating further incentives for industrialists in, for example, the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta to collude and find ways to evade the Peking tax collection agencies. So-called corruption scandals, can easily be re-interpreted as acts of heroic national patriotism against Chinese occupation (e.g. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/world/asia/chinese-tycoon-gets-life-sentence-for-smuggling.html). It is in this sense that Mr. Liu sees the potential seeds for a new spontaneous order to emerge. The idea definitely seems a little kooky at first glance, but one should never underestimate the ability of businessmen in southern China to bend the rules.

>>1875
>But the Party that Mr. Liu describes, is not merely the Communist Party (the Red Party), but also the Nationalist Party (the White Party). Both, in fact, depend on the notion of the One China Policy to justify their existence and legitimacy.
Who cares is the Party is Red or White as long as it catches mice? But I take it in the following passage you mean that there is some inherent civil conflict between the Beijing communist elite and the Canton business elite? As you say, they are both existentially dependent on NOT dividing the place. If China had another civil war, we Westerners and the Japanese etc would probably reduce them to a burned out husk. But what is Liu actually saying about this?

>Whenever the CCP compares itself to being as glorious as the Tang civilization it has to be regarded as LARP-ing. No amount of building Tang-based amusement parks, showcasing the Sogdian whirl dance on TV, or Tang-inspired animation films can revive the past glory of the Tang (which was a warrior-aristocracy with Central Asian steppe blood).
Of course. Their strength is from the new things they do for practical reasons, like having a strong Party that can keep a handle on industrial development and keep the (us) barbarians outside the great (fire-)wall.

>>1875

> Whenever the CCP compares itself to being as glorious as the Tang civilization it has to be regarded as LARP-ing.

Except the CCP doesn't need Tang anything to succeed. It just needs state capacity, sufficiently directed. For the past decade, it seems to have been doing better at this than the US. That's no guarantee of a given outcome, of course, but it seems more salient than something something Tang.

>>1876
>As you say, they are both existentially dependent on NOT dividing the place. If China had another civil war, we Westerners and the Japanese etc would probably reduce them to a burned out husk. But what is Liu actually saying about this?

So, this is the question... The bureaucrats and the industrialists have certain goals which are somewhat in conflict. The bureaucrats absolutely cannot have the place divided, but it might be better for the industrialists if they had some capacity to self-organize, since it is the industrialists who are dependent on the international order (G8, etc.). The example of that businessman, Lai of the Yuanhua Group, who used his business connections to retain resources for the Fukienese, is often cited. Had Canada recognized the rights of the Fukienese to self-determination, similar to the Tibetans, they might have reconsidered sending him back to the governing authorities on the mainland.

In Liu's writings, the local industrialists can be seen as the men with hands on levers, effectively the lower house of parliament. The upper house, the militaristic nobles, are the actual ultranationalists. By being no longer welcome in either the German (Prussian) or Russian Empire, Polish radicals led by Piłsudski had to become 1. agents of a foreign power opposed to both or at least neutral and 2. proceed with the project of
national invention outside the national homeland.

Liu points out that being anti-communist can be equated with being anti-Chinese. He points out that Chinese industrial capacity is built on the low cost of labor in China, which depends on obliterating various distinctions between
different Chinese-occupied nations. If self-organizing capacity were maintained on the basis of cultural or linguistic affiliation, as in India, goods out of China would not be as cheap.

From the perspective of the international order, the issue seems to be what actions would strengthen the international order, or equivalently, what actions are to the detriment of the great (fire-)wall. In my opinion, the first part of the wall to deal with is the claim that being anti-Chinese is anti-Asian. Being anti-Chinese is, in fact, being in favor of East Asia as a whole being able to join the international order. Nothing could be more in opposition to Anti-Asian Hate.

>>1872
Yes, reading it back, I contradicted myself more than once. I'm only going to get breezier and more superficial. Don't waste too much time on this.

The remnants, whether particular family structures, social organizations, languages, or religious practices, are degraded beyond revival, or no longer accessible to young people. It's a shame, I think, based on my own ideological bent, my own taste, that there is not much to be conserved.

But so, of course, traditions must be invented. I will accept that. Fantasy is fine. Even if a break with the recent past was not necessary, it would appeal to those that subscribe to the Liu-Spengler line on ethnogenesis, I guess. I will speak of personal taste again: I find the output a bit off-putting (evangelical anti-communism with Western Zhou characteristics, internet-poisoned Manchurian separatism).

Of course, if you believe Liu's prediction that there will be a grand event to reshuffle Chinese political organization, national revival is an urgent project.

>>1879
>I think, based on my own ideological bent, my own taste, that there is not much to be conserved.
>But so, of course, traditions must be invented.

I don't really see how eating rice and fish is a tradition about to go out of fashion in either the Yangtze River Delta or Japan, among other places. It's lasted a few thousand years by now I believe. Not that much fish once you leave the coast though.

>national revival is an urgent project

Absolutely. The question is, which nations? Manchuria is a thorny issue. Truly patriotic Chinese nationalists should be demanding the return of Outer Manchuria to China. (https://www.scmp.com/opinion/letters/article/3262799/china-must-act-fast-reclaim-lost-territories-russia)

>>1880
It seems like widespread rice and fish culture is enough an argument against distinct local traditions. Maybe we're talking past each other here, though.

Picking up that thread, have you ever looked into Li Shuo? He's a Manchu separatist. He has made diet part of his project, emphasizing the distinct character—heavy on meat, light on grains, etc.—of the native Manchurian. He drafted it up as his "Shuoist Culinary Principles": https://cnwmw.blogspot.com/2019/02/shuoist-culinary-principles.html. I think it's interesting, however I feel about him and his project, personally. We should all be confident enough to propagate culinary principles to guide nations not yet born!

>>1881
>We should all be confident enough to propagate culinary principles to guide nations not yet born!

The ultimate core of a industrial nation is a group of ultranationalistic radicals who are able to coordinate the nation's industrial capacity. Everything else is secondary.

>>1881
>We should all be confident enough to propagate culinary principles to guide nations not yet born!

The ultimate core of a industrial nation is a group of ultranationalistic radicals who are able to coordinate the nation's industrial capacity. Everything else is secondary.