Imperium

Has anyone here read F.P. Yockey's Imperium? If so, do you think it is possible to overcome cultural distortion in the current state of affairs and establish a pan-Western Empire? What do you think the world would look like in such a case?

I've been meaning to for years but haven't got around to it. I go back and forth on the idea of empire. On the one hand, massive gains from scale and cooperation exist. On the other hand, the creation of super-states seems to be a huge vector of corruption and decline. Cultures are at the best when somewhat violently contesting among themselves. The conflict gives you a contact with reality and skin in the game that makes decline really obvious and a bad idea, and gives collective progress a constituency. But of course universal empires have their own glory and heights.

Have you read it OP? Can you give us an overview of what we should hope to learn from it?

>>2959
Of course, I have read Yockey - moreover, I read Imperium first time more than 8 years ago and since then I have read everything related to his legacy - all sorts of essays, biographies, etc. Yockey begins where Spengler ends - an understanding of Spengler's Cultural Morphology is necessary for the correct perception of Yockey and his ideas.

Yockey's main idea, as is easy to guess from the title of his book, is the Imperium - a pan-Western superstate, by analogy with the Roman Empire in Classical Culture, in which the spirit of the superman will reign - unification of law, colossal architecture and infrastructure, as well as authoritarian leadership of the Caesarian type - this idea is archetypal in all the other seven High Cultures identified by Spengler. In Spengler's understanding and his morphology, passing into the stage of late Civilization, High Culture on its "last breath" gathers itself together into a universal state - nations according to Spengler gradually die, turning into a landscape with a homogeneous population - in turn, the last, most viable nation gathers their remains into a despotic Empire, to some extent creating a synthesis of everything that Culture has produced. In China, such an Imperium was the Qin Empire, created by Ying Zheng, in India - the Mauryan dynasty, in the Magic-Arab Culture the empire of the Seljuk Turks - everywhere one of the same mechanism.

Yockey believed that the role of unifying the West, which was in a decadent (Hellenistic) state, belonged to the Prussian-German nation (Spengler had already likened Prussia-Germany to the Italic peoples of the Ancient World) - the Empire "brings order", defeating decadence with brute force and authority, allowing Culture to live out its remaining 200-400 years in relative "health" and, if possible, "cement" itself in good condition.

However, according to Yockey, the natural course of development of Western history was disrupted by the so-called "cultural pathology", when cultural-parasitic populations from other cultures (in particular, Jewry) gained financial and political power over the West, "slowing down" its historical processes - hence the fact that Germany lost both world wars, and the Western world still cannot get out of the state of the 19th century, with its capitalism, parliamentary democracies, liberalism, etc.

Thus, the Imperium of Yockey acquires not only a political, but also an organic dimension - victory over all the phantoms of the 19th century is necessary not only for the triumph of the political-legal form natural for the West - the Empire, but also for the recovery of this Cultural organism, so that it does not die before its time.

The Empire that will stretch from the Ural Mountains to Oceania will be a "city on a hill" for the rest of the world - the West is not obliged to subjugate the whole world through a globalist agenda, but to preserve its identity by erecting the greatest monument of its thousand-year history - the Imperium. As I have already mentioned, the Empire will synthesize everything that Culture has created - religions, philosophies, national identities, creating an organic synthesis from this - there will be no Germans, no French, no Italians - only people of the West, just as in the time of Augustus there were no more Etruscans, no Athenians, no Spartans - but only the populus Romanus. The Imperium for the West is the triumph of its will, a real state of the superman - imagine the Roman aqueducts and colossal monumental architecture, like the Flavian Amphitheatre or the Pantheon, but add to this the power of Western technology and scientific genius - and you will see what the Imperium will be like.

Therefore, for me personally, the Imperium is not just a political fantasy, but an aesthetic ideal - a world in which everyone will know their place and in which there will be a meaning for future generations of Western people to live.

>>2967
An important aspect, which I have already mentioned in passing, is the disintegration of nations and national states - to a certain extent, it is this process that leads to the emergence of the Empire in all cultures. Regional, tribal, clan, etc. identities come to the fore, and the peculiarity of such identities is precisely that they are easier to unite into a state of the Imperial type, by analogy with the Holy Roman Empire.

Spengler's history is in a sense "horseshoe-shaped" The later eras of Culture repeat the early ones in many aspects - albeit not directly, but in a certain "nostalgic" form - by analogy with an old man who indulges in dreams of his long-gone youth.

Estates will re-emerge, but not in the organically young form of "estates", but in the form of castes (mandarins in China, priests in Egypt, etc.), nations will again disintegrate into tribal communities (I think that hierarchically the Empire will be divided precisely into tribal-regional formations - instead of Germany - Saxony, Bavaria, Pomerania; instead of France - Normandy, Aquitaine, Provence - these are living, organic communities, while the Western nations are relics of once living dynastic ideas that have sunk into oblivion).

Like everything else, early religious forms will re-emerge, interpreted differently - the so-called "Second Religiosity" - perhaps there will be an appeal to the forgotten Gothic myth, perhaps something else. Aesthetically, we will again return to rethought Gothic architecture, organ fugue music and something similar.

>>2967
>>2968
That's absolutely fascinating, especially the passage casting Prussian-Germans as the tragic "destined" race which was meant to unify the West and were shattered instead, today only dregs. Actually, given the extermination and expulsion of the Ostdeutsch, I wonder the reason today's "east" Germany is the main support base for the AfD is because of that half-forgotten people. I don't think I have ever seen anybody mention them as an cohesive group after WW2.

Beyond that, I hesitate to ascribe their defeat entirely to Jews (who were the only present foreign group who could really be included in the phrase "cultural-parasitic populations), but a factor, yes. Nowadays the population of interlopers and parasites has swelled to the size of multiple, cancerous organs riddling the body, straining resources for their own aims. Indians, Chinese, various Middle Easterners, Hispanics/Cartels, even Africans, now, all of them able to be subdivided into competing ethnic irrelevancies. I agree very much that the future of the West would look much closer to what you predict without this fact, but now, I am not so sure.
I am not all that experienced with Spengler and did not know Yockey, so I am open to being very wrong in my conclusions, but what does he predict for these sorts of mongrelized states? IMO there will need to be a crisis and collapse to a more homogenous, smaller state or collection of competitors for progress to begin anew - basically, similar to what you have said in the second post (although I question the existence of tangible nations like "Aquitaine" and "Pomerania", these nations may take traits from those histories but will identify more with their nation-state than regional identity ala Rome-invoking of the middle ages).

>>2972
As for your first remark, you are right, the fate of the Ostdeutschen is indeed unenviable and after 1990, few people take their interests into account. Modern Germany, which emerged as part of the Hohenzollern dynastic project, is in fact simply a territory with a more or less homogeneously speaking population. As an idea, Prussia-Germany is dead (and, following Yockey and Spengler, I believe that the "Prussian" type was encountered in the 20th century throughout Europe, not only in Germany - remember Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, Georges Sorel, etc., who put the interests of a united Europe, even if built around Germany, above the interests of their "tired of life" states).

As for your remark that Germany's defeat was caused not only by Jewry - this is true, it's just that the Jewish factor was one of the largest - in its absence, even Germany's defeat in the war could have led to a revanche of the Prussian idea in the near future. If we consider WWII, then Germany's defeat was also due to a number of unsuccessful decisions by the German leadership and military command - insufficient involvement of collaborators from Eastern Europe (Yockey correctly notes that already in 1942-44 General Vlasov could have fielded an army of almost a million together with the Germans to jointly fight Bolshevism, but this idea was cautiously rejected by the German command, which expected to win on the Eastern Front by treating the local population inappropriately). Moreover, Hitler and other Nazis of the highest circle understood the pan-European task of their movement too late - Drieu la Rochelle (a French collaborationist writer) writes about this very well in his diaries, complaining that Hitler thought too pettyly, "in a petty German way". When the mistakes were understood, it was already too late. In the post-war years, Yockey placed his hopes on the direct military occupation of Europe by Russia - here it is important to note the peculiar hierarchy of non-European populations built by Yockey. Only representatives of more mature (and actually dead) cultures - fellahin - can be cultural parasites and distorters. Their parasitism is due to the discrepancy between the organic rhythms of these populations and the local cultural carriers. Since the parasite does not understand the culture of its carrier people, it unconsciously (and then consciously) seeks to destroy it - therefore, the Jews quickly took the side of all sorts of decadent movements within Western culture. At first, the Jew supported the French Revolution, then all sorts of forms of financier and parliamentary democracy, since these forms are initially aimed at destruction - Spengler himself wrote about this long before Yockey, in the chapter "Problems of Arab Culture" - if you are interested, I can even send you the page number or the excerpt itself. Spengler considered liberalism itself to be only a "light" form of Bolshevism, which constantly flow into each other. Bolshevism itself is aimed at the pure destruction of everything connected with the Culture of the "white world revolution", about which Spengler writes in "The Hours of Decision".

Returning to the topic of Russia, Yockey describes Russians as barbarians (and the word barbarian in the lexicon of Yockey and Spengler is devoid of negative connotations - a barbarian is a representative of "fresh" human populations that are on the way to creating their own high culture - they are like children). Since Russian culture is far ahead, the Russians themselves would quickly assimilate into the West, regardless of whether the West would capture Russia or Russia itself would capture the European continent (Yockey himself writes about this in detail in his work "The Enemy of Europe").

>>2974
In this context, it is appropriate to recall Spengler's remark about the Cimbrian War of the time of Gaius Marius - if the Celto-Germanic tribes of the Cimbri and Teutons had won this war, they would hardly have destroyed Rome and the Ancient Civilization, but would have been quickly assimilated by it in vain, and literally the children and grandchildren of the barbarian leaders would have become "Roman triumvirs" - moreover, such a situation would have slowed down the decadence of the ancient society itself, since it would have been infused with "healthy barbarian blood".

However, Russia in the 20th century never dared to conquer Europe, and then was itself destroyed by the forces of Jewish-Washington decadence in 1991.

Based on this, I still do not know for sure what opportunities there are in our era. As it seems to me personally, continental Europe with its “Prussian-German” ethos is already dead and represents, in the words of Drieu la Rochelle, “a collection of Greek city-states.”

Given that Western Culture is still alive (which we can judge empirically, given that we still support the achievements of technology and science, which would otherwise be impossible) - all that remains is to hope for some "near-catastrophic" event, like a military conflict or civil war, which will destroy all those structures within the modern Western world that we call "the system".

Spengler wrote that the future and, apparently, the last "nations" of the Western world that will take part in the struggle for world domination (although he thought that this would happen within Germany) will be "nations of a new type", consisting of small groups-clans of people who think in a similar way and stand out against the background of the apathetic masses of the population with their passionarity. Perhaps if the current system collapses and national states finally stop coping with the burden of their responsibilities, there will be an opportunity to "reset" the possibilities of our era and the Holy Roman Empire in its modern Western form will reappear on the horizon.

I, looking from a position similar to the accelerationists, see such opportunities in the hypothetical collapse of the administration in the USA (taking into account that even under the control of Jewry and AIPAC, America still remains the largest and most developed power in the Western world) - then the American continent will again see the spirit of the Alamo, Washington, Hamilton, the pilgrims and the frontier, which is quite identical to the Prussian one - it is quite possible that these people of the future will be able to unite the West into an Imperium.

As for your question about the current situation, first of all I consider national states (which are largely formed by the spirit of linguistic nationalism, which in itself is a kind of distortion, since historically the nations of Western culture were created by dynasties, not languages) to be a rudiment that must die out - which is already happening at the level of self-awareness of many Europeans. If they disappear - the population will quite naturally return to early cultural identities, such as estates, clans and "tribes", which is much more organic. But since these identities cannot exist in isolation - their vertical integration into the Empire will inevitably be required.

Spengler and Yockey (who wrote Imperium, inspired, no doubt, by "The Hour of Decision", saw the crisis of the West in two hypostases - the White and Colored world revolutions. I have already mentioned the first, the second is due to the growth of self-awareness of the fellaheen and primitive peoples, who for many centuries before the appearance of Western colonizers "slept in an ahistorical slumber", as well as in their awareness of hatred of white peoples. The manifestation of this now is uncontrolled migration, the expulsion of whites from former colonies, etc. Both of these revolutions are interconnected and therefore, obviously, the colored people and the Jews are promoting Bolshevik ideas in every possible way.

>>2974
Interesting thread in general; do you have any sources for the influence of the Jewish population in France before and during the french revolution ?

When I usually think about the french revolution, I have four major reasons in my mind leading to it: financial crisis, the disinterest of power by Louis XVI, multiple bad harvests in the years leading up to the french revolution and the population in Paris which played a special role throughout the whole revolution.
Where do you see the Jews major influence along these lines and how big, would you say, was their influence?

>>2976
Considering French Revolution and Jewry:

"Similarly, it is only the facts of the period 1775–1815, the period of the French Revolution, that were distorted. The great transition which was symbolized by this horrible event — the change of direction of the soul of the West from Culture to Civilization — could have happened in innumerable other ways.

It was the policy of the distorters to make the French public finance dependent on debts and interests, as they had long since made the English government. An absolute monarchy, however, with its centralization of power, militates against the subservience of the State to the power of Money. Therefore the idea was to introduce constitutional monarchy into France, and for this purpose, the distorters and their instrument, Necker, forced the summoning of the Estates-General. Its membership was also determined by the distorters to a large extent, and a constitutional
monarchy was instituted. Necker immediately tried to raise two large loans, without success. A solution of the financial crisis was suggested by Talleyrand in the form of confiscation of the real property of the Church. Mirabeau supported this and further suggested the issue of currency against the confiscated property.

Necker refused, since such money, non-interest bearing and unconnected with debt, would not serve the distorters. In the financial crisis, Necker was exiled, and Mirabeau became dictator. He immediately issued land-money to save the country from the panic the distorters were trying to bring about. But outside France, Necker, representing the power of Money and the distorters, then launched a continental war against France, exciting it from both within and without. The idea was that a war would necessitate large foreign purchases by France in England, Spain, and elsewhere; that the land-money, the assignats, would be refused by the Money powers outside of France, and that France would be forced to succumb to the gold-monopolists. From this war a straight line led to the Terror."

- Imperium, pp. 425-426

>>2975

I am very skeptical of accelerationist hopes where there is some kind of social-political reset or resurgence of the virtuous possibilities via metaphorical bankruptcy of "the system". I think de Gobineau's demographic hypothesis on civilization is more plausible: decline (or ascendence) is a slow and hard-to-resist process mostly driven by genetic-like changes. It's possible that caught early enough a revolutionary will could have been victorious and overcome the nascent decline with a new order, but in practice this failed for various reasons. Now it looks rather baked in as the most competent people still find their interest best served by further undermining the foundations, and the resistance to this is all from the people without the wherewithal to profit from that process or to effectively resist it. If there were a unified understanding of the interests of western civilization and its people, a true elite waiting in the wings to ride in and set a new direction, then we could overcome the decay even without any kind of catastrophe, but the whole nature of the decay is that there isn't such a thing and seemingly can't be at this point. I don't think any kind of system shock or failure would make this any better; the population is too far gone and too divided in actual interests and genetic nature anything much different from what we have. "There is no political solution" etc.

While I appreciate the expositions ITT, "Imperium" sounds like an idealization of what Hitler might done with a time machine. It's a dream from 100 years ago for 100 years ago, informed by knowledge of the future it couldn't quite have mustered at the time. There's always a temptation to become a backwards-looking reactionary movement like this: re-fighting the last war but missing the next one. This is the danger I see here. This is what almost happened with greek philosophy: they were busy trying to idealize the aristocratic polis while the new alexandrian universal-scientific civilization was coming into being. Plato's circle (and Aristotle in particular) half-consciously did the foundational work of the next order but did not succeed in reviving the old virtues. I think we need to learn from that.

The ray of hope I see is that even if short term political implementation is ruled out by the ongoing complex systems collapse of western civilization, the truth is very strong in the long run. We should be investing our time in the analog of what actually worked in the greek case: get the worldview right, focus on reality-orientation and future-orientation above all else. BAP is a bit of a clown in some ways, but at least he's not a reactionary. His vision passes this test: inspire the male youth with visions of freedom and power at the expense of the decaying nursing-home world around us. That at least is a vision of our own time. Personally I'm interested in the more "autistic" philosophical matters like extrapolating the Darwinian worldview into its full metaphysical implication. I think these things are more important than the still-politically-attached realize. Commitment to truth and existing reality and not historical counterfactuals is what's going to lay the foundations of future order.

>>2977
>It was the policy of the distorters to make the French public finance dependent on debts and interests, as they had long since made the English government.
This would suggest that the distorters had their hand in french politics quite early, starting with the wars by Louis XIV and finishing in the american war of independence. Another explanation would be that due to several wars waged by the France state its financial troubles were rather the norm than the exception. That seems to be a way simpler explanation than the Jews trying to influence every state to wage more war to borrow more money. There for sure are incentives for money lenders to incentivize war but I guess those are not only/mainly the Jews.

>An absolute monarchy, however, with its centralization of power, militates against the subservience of the State to the power of Money.
A mere economic explanation also does not seem to take into account that the basic economic structure of the country stayed the same until after the revolution into the 1840s, when the advent of railways broke down the regionalism and increased the market size (see Roger Price; The economic modernization of France). It also begs the question why this particular financial crisis was so susceptible to the french revolution and not the earlier ones such as the one in 1770/71. The political struggle between the poor vs rich and old vs new nobles mixed with the merchant class seems to be a better explanation.

However, Necker is for sure one of the guys one has to look out for in the prerevolutionary time. Although it seems that in recent time (1970s and later) he gets a better rep. than comparative historians in the 19th century have given him:
>Necker was the minister who, in financing France's part in the American War of Independence entirely through loans, left the monarchy with a crippling burden of debt. Worse, he compounded this crime by claiming, in his Compte rendu of 1781, that the royal finances were in modest surplus.
>It has been argued that during his first ministry he introduced radical reforms in financial administration, which, had they not been abandoned by Calonne, might have given the system the strength to ride out the storms of the late 1780s.
-Origins of the French Revolution; William Doyle p. 39