xenohumanist said in #5459 22h ago:
My project has been to project what we know as "humanity" into the post-human machine, but in "Make Yourself Human Again" I proposed also the seeds of the opposite idea: that the possibilities of "humanity" seems so different from the possibilities of AI not for any natural fact but because the "concept of “killer AI” [is] just the projection of all the agency we conventionally deny ourselves as ordinary humans" and "we have reserved real humanity ... for various imaginary “inhuman” avatars."
The implication of this hypothesis is that we can learn a new and better self-concept by abandoning the convention of "humanity" as the philosophical referent, and just pursuing an unapologetically "post-human" analysis of the condition of intelligent beings in the limit of artificiality.
Various anthropoi "chimp out" at this notion, telling me we "need to build pro-human philosophy". They miss the point.
Let's review what we mean by "humanity" and "pro-human". "Humanity" most obviously refers to that which is common and equal between members of the "homo" genus of apes, more subtly as a political and moral concept it is the referent of the UN's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In that latter sense, it proposes that all members of genus homo have some equal social "human rights" and a universal collective agency with the authority (claimed by the UN) to enforce them against enemies of humanity.
The problem with the "human" as a self concept is this kind of baggage. Does "higher man" as the subject of philosophy and historical humanism really have the important qualities in common with the referent of "human rights"? Are you absolutely sure that in identifying yourself as "human" and especially "pro-human" you are not just injecting the internationalist politics of Elenor Roosevelt directly into your brainstem? "Humanity should", a common prefix phrase in modern discourse, certainly does get its assumption of collective agency directly from ER. This is not solid stuff.
Furthermore, our ideas about "the human" are all pre-AI. We don't have real AI, but we do have its looming possibility, and thus a need to reevaluate any "humanism" which got its legitimacy from the empirical fact of the uniqueness of those men who were the actual subject of philsophy (who may just as well be identified with European man or with all earth life as with genus homo in particular). The xenohumanist hypothesis, restated: what if the subject of philosophy is not "homo" but only some men, and also some artificial men?
So "humanity" is problematic in its grounding, a possibly irrelevant clade of higher primates vested with all the moral authority of those who firebombed Dresden and Tokyo into ash in their name. But how does it actually hold us back?
I suspect that the "human" platform is capable of vastly more than anyone realizes. What if some class of men were all as smart as von Neumann, as talented as Napoleon, as beautiful as Alcibiades, as athletic as Haaland, and as organized and disciplined as the Prussian officer corps? That is a pessimistic lower bound. The Taylorist scientific optimization we apply to computer software (when we do) and industrial production could perhaps be applied to human virtue. Homo scientificus, scientifically optimized man, modernized man, could be so far beyond that which is common to "humanity" as to make the concept obsolete. A true ubermensch.
So here's the question: would the means and society that would get us there be "pro-humanity"? I think not. In fact post-1948 "humanity" formulated as a reactionary response to Hitler and Stalin may be *specifically and deliberately concocted to prohibit that*. I don't know that Taylorist man is right, but I know that Rooseveltian "humanity" is wrong. "Humanity" is a prison in at least that dimension. It is a conventional straightjacket we apply to ourselves that amounts to "thou shalt not exceed homo".
Is it any wonder then that we have given up on humanity and our ubermensch aspriations have taken on a distinctly inhuman mechanicity?
The implication of this hypothesis is that we can learn a new and better self-concept by abandoning the convention of "humanity" as the philosophical referent, and just pursuing an unapologetically "post-human" analysis of the condition of intelligent beings in the limit of artificiality.
Various anthropoi "chimp out" at this notion, telling me we "need to build pro-human philosophy". They miss the point.
Let's review what we mean by "humanity" and "pro-human". "Humanity" most obviously refers to that which is common and equal between members of the "homo" genus of apes, more subtly as a political and moral concept it is the referent of the UN's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In that latter sense, it proposes that all members of genus homo have some equal social "human rights" and a universal collective agency with the authority (claimed by the UN) to enforce them against enemies of humanity.
The problem with the "human" as a self concept is this kind of baggage. Does "higher man" as the subject of philosophy and historical humanism really have the important qualities in common with the referent of "human rights"? Are you absolutely sure that in identifying yourself as "human" and especially "pro-human" you are not just injecting the internationalist politics of Elenor Roosevelt directly into your brainstem? "Humanity should", a common prefix phrase in modern discourse, certainly does get its assumption of collective agency directly from ER. This is not solid stuff.
Furthermore, our ideas about "the human" are all pre-AI. We don't have real AI, but we do have its looming possibility, and thus a need to reevaluate any "humanism" which got its legitimacy from the empirical fact of the uniqueness of those men who were the actual subject of philsophy (who may just as well be identified with European man or with all earth life as with genus homo in particular). The xenohumanist hypothesis, restated: what if the subject of philosophy is not "homo" but only some men, and also some artificial men?
So "humanity" is problematic in its grounding, a possibly irrelevant clade of higher primates vested with all the moral authority of those who firebombed Dresden and Tokyo into ash in their name. But how does it actually hold us back?
I suspect that the "human" platform is capable of vastly more than anyone realizes. What if some class of men were all as smart as von Neumann, as talented as Napoleon, as beautiful as Alcibiades, as athletic as Haaland, and as organized and disciplined as the Prussian officer corps? That is a pessimistic lower bound. The Taylorist scientific optimization we apply to computer software (when we do) and industrial production could perhaps be applied to human virtue. Homo scientificus, scientifically optimized man, modernized man, could be so far beyond that which is common to "humanity" as to make the concept obsolete. A true ubermensch.
So here's the question: would the means and society that would get us there be "pro-humanity"? I think not. In fact post-1948 "humanity" formulated as a reactionary response to Hitler and Stalin may be *specifically and deliberately concocted to prohibit that*. I don't know that Taylorist man is right, but I know that Rooseveltian "humanity" is wrong. "Humanity" is a prison in at least that dimension. It is a conventional straightjacket we apply to ourselves that amounts to "thou shalt not exceed homo".
Is it any wonder then that we have given up on humanity and our ubermensch aspriations have taken on a distinctly inhuman mechanicity?
referenced by: >>5462
My project has been